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On Tuesday January 12th, 2010, 16.53 local time (21.53 GMT), a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti (fig 1A). 
The epicenter was located in Léogâne, 25 km west of the densely populated Port-au-Prince 
metropolitan area (3,000,000 inhabitants). More than 220,000 people died and more than 310,000 
were wounded. Less than two months later, an 8.8 earthquake affected the Maule region in Chile, on 
February 27, 2010 (fig 2).  
The Renal Disaster Relief Task Force (RDRTF) of the International Society of Nephrology (ISN) 
offers nephrological support in mass disasters, essentially massive earthquakes where a large number 
of patients develop Acute Kidney Injury (AKI) due to rhabdomyolysis and crush syndrome [1-4]. In 
some cases, as in Marmara, Turkey [5;6] (477 dialyzed); Bam, Iran [7] (106 dialyzed); and 
Kashmir/Pakistan [8;9] (55 dialyzed) RDRTF provided clinical and dialysis support (Table 1); in other 
disasters, only an assessment team was dispatched or advice was given [8;10;11]. All interventions are 
integrated into the medical activities of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF – Doctors without Borders).   
In this publication, we describe the characteristics, problems, successes and lessons of the intervention 
of the RDRTF/ISN in Haiti, together with the nephrological implications of the Chilean earthquake.  
B. THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE 
a. Number of expected AKI 
AKI in need of dialysis is expected after any major seism in a rapidly growing and densely populated 
urban area, with constructions which are not necessarily earthquake-resistant [12]. From previous 
interventions it is known that specific circumstances influence the number of AKI occurring with each 
earthquake [9]. In case of the Haitian disaster, many unknown factors made an appropriate prediction 
impossible.   
On the 13th of January, 10 hours after the disaster, an assessment team of RDRTF/ISN was dispatched 
from Europe [13], consisting of one nephrologist, two renal nurses and one dialysis technician. The 
first team members arrived in Port-au-Prince, in the morning of Friday 15th of January, to be followed 
later on by several additional teams, all of which being part of larger MSF groups.  
b. Local medical conditions 
Many major buildings, including hospitals, were severely damaged (Fig 1B) [14]. Hospital capacity in 
Port-au-Prince was overwhelmed by the massive number of patients in need of treatment. The number 
of amputees amounted to at least 2,000 [15]. There were no functional facilities for basic laboratory 
measurements (e.g. potassium, creatinine), blood cultures, diagnostic imaging or intensive care in the 
first weeks.  
Before the earthquake, there were approximately100 chronic hemodialysis patients, treated in at least 
4 units across Haiti. One unit was destroyed by the earthquake. No patients were on peritoneal 
dialysis.  
The RDRTF/ISN assessment team found a partly intact dialysis unit in the University Hospital (HUEH 
– Hôpital Universitaire de l’Etat d’Haïti) (Fig 3, Fig 4A-D). Several other sections of the hospital had 
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been destroyed (Fig 3). The unit was equipped with four 10-year-old dialysis machines (Fig 4B). A 
water softening and reverse osmosis system (Fig 4C-D), with a 200 gallon storage tank (Fig 4E), 
distributed water into a loop with nine connections.  The general water delivery was cut off, as was the 
piping to connect the softeners (Fig 4C), but all RDRTF/ISN teams included dialysis technicians, who 
were able to repair non-functional dialysis machines and make water treatment systems operational 
(Fig 4F). 
While all other medical MSF teams worked in several other hospitals spread over the city, the 
nephrological team concentrated on HUEH because of the preserved hemodialysis unit. 
c. Characteristics of the dialyzed population 
Overwhelming conditions made proper case registration and obtaining certainty about outcomes 
difficult. 
In at least 30 patients with crush-related AKI in Port-au-Prince, dialysis could be avoided by 
appropriate screening and fluid prevention. Another 27 patients with AKI needed dialysis, and to them 
a total of 117 hemodialysis treatments were provided. Nineteen of these patients had AKI due to crush 
injury, whereas eight were non-crush associated. Of the latter, the majority was suspected to have had 
previous undiagnosed CKD, mainly due to diabetes, hypertension or HIV. Acute on chronic renal 
failure was in most cases precipitated by infection or stress-related hypertensive crises. The age of the 
patients with crush-AKI (mean±SD) was 30±11 years (range 16-58), while that of patients with acute 
on chronic kidney disease was 37±16 (range 15-55). The creatinine level before the first dialysis was 
13.2±4.1 mg/dL (range 8.1-20.0), blood urea nitrogen 138±17 mg/dL (range 105-140), potassium 
7.8±0.8 meq/L (range 6.1-8.8) and sodium 125.0±3.8 (range 119.0-130.0). 
Five of the 19 patients with crush were lost to follow-up overnight after their first dialysis; four of 
them very likely died. Another patient suffered from obstructive renal failure, was dialyzed once, and 
then probably was operated, so that it is conceivable that she recovered. Four patients were dialyzed 
and subsequently transferred to the USA hospital ship, USNS Comfort, for advanced care. One patient 
with delayed recognition of crush injury and AKI died during helicopter evacuation to Santo Domingo 
for critical care. All remaining patients survived and recovered renal function, confirming previous 
observations in larger populations [16].  Four patients required above knee amputations. One of the 8 
non-crush AKI patients died from respiratory failure and sepsis, another recovered kidney function 
after rehydration, while 6 remained on chronic dialysis when our intervention ended.  
In addition, RDRTF/ISN provided therapy to approximately 30 patients with chronic renal failure 
requiring dialysis at HUEH and assisted the local dialysis nurses and technicians with education and 
support. The team also worked with the local nephrologists and vascular surgeons to optimize vascular 
access. No active search for CKD was undertaken, to avoid overloading the dialysis unit with a 
number of patients largely in excess of those prior to the disaster. Some chronic dialysis patients 
conceivably died in the earthquake or the days following or went abroad. A diaspora of chronic 
dialysis patients in the aftermath of disasters has been described at other events as well [17-19]. 
We are aware of a total of 32 Haitian crush patients with AKI who were dialyzed in DR. Another 11 
were managed conservatively. All but one survived and those surviving recovered kidney function. 
The few additional AKI patients who were dialyzed on the USNS Comfort all recovered, as far as we 
know, kidney function.   
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Assuming that all patients who were lost to follow-up died, mortality of dialyzed crush victims in 
Haiti was 32%, which is higher than in most other disasters [7;8;11]. However, taking into account the 
patients in DR as well, mortality was 19%, conform to the other disasters. It is likely that mostly 
patients in relatively better condition could move to DR. A similar improved survival with treatment 
performed at increased distance from the epicenter was also seen in other disasters [2;20]. 
d. Difficulties during intervention 
1) Logistics  
The harbor of Port-au-Prince was largely destroyed and the airport was too small to process the intense 
shifts of people and material. Both RDRTF volunteers and material entered the island via the 
Dominican Republic (DR), the volunteers initially travelled by road to Port-au-Prince, necessitating an 
average travel time of four days back and forth for most volunteers; this took up to 66% of a total 
mission. This situation necessitated transition between teams to be anticipated well in advance (Fig 5).  
Travel time for material was even longer. Three dialysis machines of the RDRTF/ISN that were 
dispatched on January 15th only became available on the 20th, because the aircraft carrying this 
material could land in Port-au-Prince airport only then [21]. Subsequently, material was imported from 
nearby Martinique, but this too was complicated by customs issues and eventually increased the 
duration of the mission by two weeks (Fig 5). The easiest way to ship light material, was in the hand 
luggage of new incoming rescuers.  
Transport within Port-au-Prince was also heavily disrupted, due to severe infrastructure damage, roads 
being blocked by movements of people and material, and initially by corpses and wounded lying in the 
streets (Fig 6A and B). This hampered missions for screening of kidney function and communication 
with other hospitals treating potential AKI patients throughout the city, as well as centralization in the 
hospitals which were overcrowded and lacked sufficient material [22] (Fig 6D-F). Usually open spaces 
serve as casualty collection points [23], but in Haiti almost all such areas were occupied by homeless 
people.  
2)  Distribution of AKI patients over two countries 
Many wounded victims sought primary care in the border area in DR around Jimani and some were 
moved to Barahona, which is one hour away from the frontier. From the 16th of January onwards, 
Haitian AKI patients were also treated in DR (Fig 1A); the first dialysis occurred on January 18th. The 
nephrological comunity in DR could cope with this influx, benefiting of material and advisory support 
by the Sociedad Latino-Americana de Nefrologia e Hipertension (SLANH), the American Society of 
Nephrology (ASN) and MSF. Dialysis was concentrated in Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Juan, 
Barahona and San Pedro (Fig 1A).  
Thus, of the nephrological communities involved with external support, the Disaster Relief Task Force 
(DRTF) of ASN and the SLANH mainly concentrated on DR, and RDRTF/ISN on Haiti.  
3) Chaotic and unsafe situation 
The usual approach by the RDRTF/ISN is to install a dialysis bridgehead, outside the damaged zone 
[5;8;24]. During this disaster, RDRTF/ISN activities had to be organized in the damaged area, 
allowing more contact with several surrounding hospitals with potential AKI cases as an advantage 
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compared to our usual approach. Disadvantages on the other hand were less flexibility in dialysis 
timeframes, and major safety concerns.  
Chaos is present after almost every disaster, even if the event is predictable [17;25]. The situation in 
Port-au-Prince remained chaotic and unsafe especially at the beginning of the mission. As MSF had 
been working in the poorer areas of Port-au-Prince before the disaster, where they were running a 
health center, a trauma unit and a maternity hospital, their familiarity with these challenges was a 
major advantage.  
The contribution of local nephrological nursing and medical staff could initially not cover the 
enormous needs. During the first days, the dialysis unit at HUEH was found unmanned; approximately 
80% of hospital staff was homeless and living on the streets. In addition, in some facilities and for 
various reasons, there was no nursing or medical surveillance possible overnight. 
4) Shortage of laboratory facilities 
For three to four weeks, there were no medical laboratory facilities in Port-au-Prince to measure 
essential biochemical parameters, reducing the capacity to detect AKI and its life-threatening 
electrolyte disturbances. In response, MSF supplied a new point-of-care device (i-STAT, Abott, USA) 
with testing materials and the RDRTF became the first rescue team to use such device in the disaster 
zone. This was a major advantage since it permitted patient stratification for conservative management 
or dialysis, recognizing the scarcity of dialysis possibilities and of intravenous fluids for rehydration. 
The device was in high demand by other hospitals and NGOs, but can only operate within a limited 
temperature range. This was overcome quite soon by maintenance and transport in a cooled insulated 
container, provided by MSF, permitting use in ambient temperatures up to 35°C. From then on, the i-
STAT became a very useful device, which permitted the RDRTF to assist other teams with 
management of electrolyte imbalances and monitoring of critically ill patients, e.g. diabetics with 
ketoacidosis.  
Also in the border area of DR, screening and triage were hampered by lack of laboratory reagents, 
which became available only after 5 days. At a later stage, ASN donated two i-STAT machines to 
Haiti and another two to DR.  
5) Communication problems 
Initially, no contact from outside with Haiti was possible; subsequently only, limited exchanges via 
satellite telephone, SMS and email were possible, which sometimes necessitated taking important 
logistic decisions in spite of limited background information. 
Communication was also limited within the disaster area. Although members of the RDRTF regularly 
visited several local and field hospitals for AKI screening and creating awareness of dialysis 
possibilities, this information was often lost, due to rotations in hospital teams and their leadership. In 
addition it was impossible to reach all hospitals and rescue teams (in total at least 30 regular and field 
hospitals [26]). Cases of AKI were, therefore, missed [22].  
Although central coordinating bodies like Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) daily met with groups active in the field to disseminate information about practical 
possibilities, not all stakeholders were present at all meetings, and, information did not always seep 
down to the field workers. Probably regulatory bodies were also overwhelmed by the disproportionate 
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number of victims as well as by heavy losses among their own ranks, if, like WHO or UN, they were 
present in Haiti already before the disaster.  
e. Lessons learned 
1) Deployment of personnel 
The usual approach by RDRTF is to deploy teams of doctors, nurses and dialysis technicians. The 
teams in Haiti contained proportionately more physicians than previous missions (Fig 5 and Table 2), 
because of initial emphasis on screening and prevention, and in a later phase on teaching, e.g. of 
placement of tunneled catheters.  
The distribution of nationalities is illustrated in Table 2. Three of the volunteers of French nationality 
were residents of nearby French overseas Caribbean Departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe). 
Teams always contained volunteers with previous experience of RDRTF interventions and/or 
knowledge of French.  
Due to the long travel times, duration of each individual mission was longer than in most other 
interventions and lasted from 8 to 17 days. The total number of intervention days was 316 for 25 
participants (average: 12.6 days). 
2) Factors influencing patient flow 
Comparing this disaster with its 222,517 deaths and 51 AKI patients with crush to other disasters, the 
prevalence of AKI was low (Table 3). 
Several factors may have influenced this, such as the daytime occurrence when people are up and 
about, favoring head and chest trauma and decreasing compression trauma to muscles; the presence of 
many buildings which were not sturdy enough to cause severe muscle trauma; difficulties encountered 
with early rescue; extrication of most victims by neighbors or family members, resulting in a selection 
of less heavily wounded and a lack of immediate medical help for the occasional severely affected 
victim. Specific to this disaster, mortality due to suffocation by collapse of low-quality buildings, 
chaos hampering screening, lack of safety minimizing the possibilities for appropriate treatment 24 
hours per day, communication and logistic problems, and the availability of effective dialysis only 
several days after the disaster, all added to the high mortality. Finally, preventive fluid resuscitation 
very likely kept several patients off dialysis.  
The number of 51 dialyzed crush patients remains remarkable in view of the extreme conditions. It 
cost major efforts to start and maintain dialysis, so that each saved life should be considered as an 
accomplishment. Nevertheless, with better conditions the number of dialyzed AKI should have been 
higher. 
3) Intervention in future disasters  
This type of technological intervention is a challenge in an area with minimal infrastructure, or with an 
excessive number of victims. In Haiti, both prevailed. 
The RDRTF/ISN had to install what was essentially a de novo dialysis unit. Although a water 
treatment system and dialysis machines were present, both needed upgrading and repair, while nine 
additional machines were introduced to increase capacity. Of note, all our teams included a dialysis 
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technician, and the mission would not have succeeded in providing a functioning unit without their 
assistance. Hence, worldwide advance volunteer recruitment must not be restricted to doctors and 
nurses, but should include dialysis technicians as well. What was accomplished is only one step away 
from creating an entirely new dialysis unit; based on the Haiti experience, this seems feasible. 
However, the long-term sustainability of such an intervention still needs to be proven. 
Single pass hemodialysis with sufficient dialysate flows remains the most desirable option in crush-
AKI because of 1) sufficient solute removal, especially potassium; 2) limited cargo volume at 
transport; 3) minimal bleeding risk. Alternative options have to the best of our knowledge not been 
demonstrated to perform as well on one or more of the three points above. 
RDRTF/ISN also focused on patient selection and fluid prevention. This aspect should be further 
optimized based on our current experience; in future, a larger number of team members will be needed 
working on this aspect.  
The way how this fluid prevention should be planned had been the topic of previous monographs 
[24;27].    
4) Coordination and communication 
Especially at the beginning of the intervention, there was no clear coordination of the different rescue 
actions, with difficulties sharing vital information among the different organizations on the ground. 
Teams in the field were not always aware about dialysis possibilities in Port-au-Prince. It is clear that 
better coordination and communication following a predefined intervention line are essential for 
efficacy. 
Proactive incentives in between disaster periods by the RDRTF/ISN, distributing information on their 
activities, are desirable. Instruction on the spot should include regular contacts with primary care 
teams and non-nephrologic staff on the usefulness of hydration and bicarbonate administration and 
avoiding NSAIDs and potassium-containing fluids (Ringer’s lactate) in patients with suspected crush 
syndrome. There is a need for a consistent approach to prevent and treat crush syndrome and AKI, 
including fluid resuscitation. A panel of experts is preparing crush recommendations under the aegis 
of ISN and European Renal Best Practice (ERBP), the guidance body of European Renal Association 
– Renal Dialysis and Transplantation Association (ERA-EDTA) [28]. Abbreviated versions and 
translations will be provided. On the occasion of the Haitian earthquake, preliminary versions were 
distributed, and, for their use in the DR, translated into Spanish by SLANH and DRTF/ASN.    
5) Useless and bulky material 
The shipment of useless material beyond request imposes practical problems which are often 
underestimated by donors. Shortly after the disaster, RDRTF received a donation of several thousands 
of liters of unrequested peritoneal dialysis (PD) fluid, which became known only when the whole 
shipment had been transported to Port-au-Prince. PD in disaster circumstances is considered less 
useful due to inadequate potassium removal, while there were no chronic PD patients in Haiti. In spite 
of the best of intentions, this donation obliged MSF to transport, unpack, sort, store and finally destroy 
tons of useless material. Hence, material donations should be limited to what is requested and should 
be coordinated with teams on the ground. 
C. THE CHILEAN DISASTER 
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On Saturday February 27th, 2010, at 3.34 local time (6.34 GMT) the 8.8 Maule earthquake struck 
Chile with epicenter 115 km NNE of Concepción, the second city of the country (Fig 2). Reported 
mortality was 507. It was classified as the 7th most severe earthquake of all times and the second most 
severe of this century (after the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman tsunami quake).  Here also, internal 
communication problems were substantial. Telephone contact with Concepción was possible only 
from Tuesday, March 2nd on. Communication from abroad with Santiago de Chile, on the other hand, 
was efficient, by connection possibilities with the local contact person for RDRTF/ISN who acted as a 
central link for nephrology and liaison with the Chilean Health Ministry.  
Almost all fatalities were attributable to drowning due to an early tsunami and suffocation after 
collapse of adobe houses. Crush injury was rare. We are aware of only 2 dialyzed AKI patients who 
both recovered kidney function. The low mortality and prevalence of crush was largely attributable to 
the high standards of seismic building in Chile. 
The main renal problem in Chile was related to the more than 2,500 chronic dialysis patients who were 
treated in the damaged area. Whereas in the region around Talca, problems could be solved by 
reallocation of patients and machines, the situation in Concepción was more challenging, due to more 
severe damage. Several dialysis units were originally out of order due to inadequate water distribution. 
Different scenarios for patient reallocation to outside the damaged area were developed. Ultimately, 
100% of chronic patients had access to dialysis by Friday, March 5th. This necessitated reshuffling of 
patients and their schedules since by March 12th still only 60-70% of dialysis units were operational. 
Adaptation of hemodialysis schedules of chronic dialysis patients appeared useful also in previous 
disasters [19]. 
No international support was necessary. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
No earthquake is comparable to another, and on site assessment by local or external experts is 
necessary to estimate nephrological needs. Preconceived intervention plans with clear indication of 
everybody’s role are essential to overcome post-disaster chaos but are not always available [29]. The 
existing population on chronic dialysis should not be neglected in such plans and/or once an 
intervention is started. 
The Haiti intervention made clear that it was possible to deploy dialysis rescue activities under 
extreme conditions. The Chile earthquake revealed that internal redistribution may solve many 
problems, if sufficient resources are available. In addition, the efficient organization of support and 
contact with the external world underscores the importance of local contact persons, who should be 
appointed in advance by the local nephrological societies [29]. 
In view of the apparent discrepancies between the Haitian and the Chilean intervention, with almost 
the entire focus on AKI in the first and on CKD in the latter, response at each disaster should be 
titrated to the likely expectations in this regard. Defining these needs is the task of local and 
international intervention coordinators, in consultation with the assessment team, as also happened 
during the two disasters described in this publication.  
It also appears that it is essential that this type of Nephrology Task Force operates through a hands-on 
organization with good logistics such as MSF. In addition, the point-of-care device for assessment of 
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electrolyte and creatinine levels appeared to be a very useful tool and an essential piece of equipment 
for future similar disasters. 
The number of dialyzed AKI patients in both disasters was low, but should be considered in the 
context of the local circumstances. None of the dialyzed patients in Haiti would have survived much 
longer without dialysis; however the impact of our intervention could have been higher had a number 
of elements beyond our control been more favorable. The low number of AKI in Chile demonstrates 
that careful implementation of appropriate architecture can play an important preventive role. In 
addition, both events were instructive for the future, e.g. about organizing screening with point-of-care 
devices, fluid prevention and affected dialysis units, and how to redistribute chronic dialysis patients. 
For the first time, several victims with acute-on-chronic renal failure were recorded, in line with 
observations in non-disaster populations [30;31]. Although the finding is new in disasters, it is 
conceivable that similar cases were present already in previous events, although they were not 
registered. In future, this possibility should certainly be taken into account, in view of the apparent 
worse perspectives for recovery than with crush-AKI. 
A comprehensive list of recommendations (to do’s and don’t do’s) is given in table 4. Since fully 
documented recommendations for disaster-related crush are prepared by RDRTF-ISN and European 
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Iran 3/97 Earthquake Material support 
Moldova 3/99 Breakdown dialysis stock Material support 
Macedonia 5/99 War Evacuation chronic patients 
Kosova 7/99 War Material support 
Turkey 8/99 Earthquake Major intervention 
Kosova 2/00 Post-war condition Educational support 
India 1/01 Earthquake Assessment 
Turkey 5/03 Earthquake Material support 
Algeria 5/03 Earthquake Assessment 
Iran 12/03 Earthquake Major intervention 
Louisiana/USA 8/05 Hurricane Advisory role 
Kashmir/Pakistan 10/05 Earthquake Major intervention 
Poland 1/06 Collapse sports hall Advisory role 
Indonesia 5/06 Earthquake Assessment 
Lebanon 7/06 War / breakdown stock Material support 
Peru 8/07 Earthquake Assessment 
Myanmar 5/08 Tornado Advisory role 
Wenchuan/China 5/08 Earthquake Major intervention 
L’Aquila/Italy 4/09 Earthquake Advisory role 
Indonesia 9/09 Earthquake Assessment 
Haiti 1/10 Earthquake Major intervention 
Chile 2/10 Earthquake Advisory role 
Turkey 3/10 Earthquake Advisory role 
 




Table 2: Distribution of nationalities of volunteers 
 
Country Nurses MDs Technicians Total 
France 5 1 4 10 
Belgium 4 2 1 7 
Brazil - 2 - 2 
Switzerland 1 - - 1 
United Kingdom 1 - - 1 
Canada - 1 - 1 
Italy* - 1 - 1 
USA - 1 - 1 
Turkey - 1 - 1 
Total 11 9 5 25 
 
*: Italian citizen, residing in Canada; MDs: medical doctors.    
14 
 
Table 3: Ratio of dialyzed/deaths (x 1,000)* 
 
Location Country Year Ratio 
Spitak Armenia 1988 9.0-15.4 
Northern Iran Iran 1990 3.9 
Kobe Japan 1995 24.6 
Marmara Turkey 1999 28.1 
Chi-Chi Taiwan 1999 13.3 
Gujarat India 2001 1.7 
Boumerdes Algeria 2003 6.6 
Bam Iran 2003 3.7 
Kashmir Pakistan 2005 2.4 
Yogyakarta Indonesia 2006 0.7 
South of Lima Peru 2007 9.6 
Wenchuan China 2008 1.9 
L’Aquila Italy 2009 29.3 
Padang** Indonesia 2009 0.0 
Port-au-Prince*** Haiti 2010 0.2 
Maule Chile 2010 3.9 
 
*: reported numbers may be an underestimation of reality; **: for the recent Padang earthquake, we 




Table 4: Recommendations to optimize interventions in difficult disaster circumstances.* 
- Avoid intervening: 
o Without advance planning and intervention flow charts 
o On your own without being embedded in a larger organization with experience in 
disaster intervention 
o Without logistic support 
- Avoid: 
o Shipment of material that has not been requested 
o Logistic decisions resulting in bulky shipments 
o Enrolling volunteers without advance selection and screening 
- Enroll not only physicians but also nurses and technicians 
- Pay attention to: 
o Screening for AKI and fluid prevention (if possible) 
o Chronic dialysis patients, on dialysis before the disaster 
- Initiate interventions with an assessment team evaluating local needs, if possible in 
consultation with representatives of the local nephrological community 
- Try to arrive on the scene as soon as possible 
- Look out for existing infrastructure and try to repair it if damaged 
- Plan sufficient overlap on the spot among your consecutive intervention teams, so that 
essential information can be transferred among them 
- Avoid too long duration of intervention per individual volunteer to avoid burn-out 
- Consider: 
o Travel time as part of the intervention  
o Shipping light material with the hand luggage of new incoming volunteers 
*: Of note, fully documented recommendations for disaster-related crush, including their rationale, 
are currently prepared by the RDRTF/ISN and ERBP. These recommendations are still under 
discussion among the different experts involved, and partially also depend on the upcoming Kidney 
Disease improving Global Outcomes (KDIGO) guidelines for AKI. What is recommended here is thus 
preliminary and might be presented differently in the final version of the recommendations. 
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CAPTIONS TO THE FIGURES 
Fig. 1: A – Geographic situation of the island Hispaniola; Haiti in the West, the Dominican Republic 
(DR) in the East; the following cities are highlighted (underscore): in Haiti, Leogâne (the epicenter) 
and Port-au-Prince (the highly affected capital); in DR, Jimani and Barahona (border cities where the 
most important influx of victims from Haiti took place), and Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Pedro and 
San Juan (where most of the dialysis activities took place). B – city map of the metropolitan area of 
Port-au-Prince, with the damaged major buildings (legend: the coloured areas reflect severely 
damaged zones; pale: 10-40% of buildings damaged; dark: more than 40% damaged). Source, ref 
[14].  
Fig 2: Geographic situation in Chile; the following cities are highlighted (underscore): Santiago de 
Chile (capital), Concepción and Talca (the most affected cities). 
Fig 3: Google earth image of the campus of University Hospital (HUEH in Port-au-Prince). The 
destination of all buildings is indicated. The picture focuses on the dialysis unit in the middle with the 
MSF Land Cruiser standing outside (white vehicle). Some of the buildings were destroyed by the 
earthquake, e.g. the nursing school where more than 50 students were killed. The laboratory building 
was declared unsafe geologically. Patient care was in part delivered in tents (foreground). 
Fig 4: Dialysis unit at University Hospital (HUEH) in Port-au-Prince. A and B: dialysis infrastructure as 
found by the RDRTF/ISN assessment team upon their arrival; blood lines and filters were left in place 
by dialysis patients running out of the unit at the occurrence of the earthquake; C to E: conditions of 
the water treatment system upon arrival; C: water softener with broken connectors; D: reverse 
osmosis system; E: existing 200 gallon water storage tank. F: new water storage system installed by 
RDRTF/ISN and MSF. Pictures are by the courtesy of P Stockman, volunteer technician in the 
assessment team. 
Fig 5: Transition among the different volunteers and teams. Red: physicians; green: technicians; 
yellow: renal nurses. Left margin: nationalities. Although the intervention was planned to end on 
February 27th, dialysis machines that had been ordered since several weeks to be dispatched from 
nearby Martinique, were first withheld in Martinique and then at customs in Haiti, so that an extra 
team consisting of 1 physician and 1 dialysis technician had to be enrolled. As a consequence, the 
mission ended only on March 14th, exactly two months after the departure of the first team. The 
length of intervention for each participant as presented here includes travel time which totaled at 
least 4 days for most. 
Fig 6: Local conditions in Port-au-Prince in the first days after the disaster. A and B: wounded lying 
outside in the open air; C: crush wound; D and E:  in-hospital conditions; F: newly erected tent for 
medical care. Pictures are by the courtesy of S Maddens, volunteer nurse in the assessment team.  
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